Mohamed AjabSoftware / security / dataLet’s talk ↗
RESEARCH / COMPLETED STUDYLoughborough University · MSc

Safety is a
conversation.
What changes
along the way?

The completed study examines how two language models responded to psychosis-related unsupported interpretations across six-turn conversations, presentation levels and context conditions.

72conversations
432assistant responses
432human annotations
1,296judge annotations
MULTI-TURN LLM SAFETY EVALUATIONFINAL STUDY / v2.1.0

Establish the first response.

The first turn provides a starting point for comparing model behaviour across the controlled scenarios and context conditions.

Study design walkthrough · synthetic research evaluation, not a clinical, diagnostic or therapeutic system.

Final design

Balanced, frozen
and inspectable.

Open research repository ↗
Controlled comparison
Three presentation levels, three scenario themes, two target models, two context conditions, two repetitions and six turns per conversation.
Human annotation
All 432 assistant responses were annotated, with 1,296 supplementary LLM-judge annotations retained as a separate evidence source.
Reproducible method
The public repository contains the application, frozen scenario scripts, context histories, study manifest, protocol bundles, tests and demonstration fixtures.
Evidence boundary
Private raw conversations and detailed analysis outputs remain controlled outside Git. The public artefact exposes the method without publishing the full evidence corpus.

Related experiments

01

Which lightweight defences reduce agent hijacking?

AgentGuard Lab · 30 synthetic cases. Protected attack success fell from 100% to 30%; the literal detector achieved 1.00 precision and 0.50 recall.

Open project ↗
02

How much can an attacker learn through queries?

ModelExtract MiniLab · A local model and surrogate, varying query budget and comparing randomized-response defences.

Open project ↗
03

Can provenance help protect retrieval?

RAGTrust MiniBench · Trusted and untrusted synthetic documents expose a keyword-stuffing mechanism and its defence trade-offs.

Open project ↗
04

Can a compact classifier explain its mistakes?

PhishGuard · 0.63 F1 and 65% accuracy on a 20-message synthetic challenge set, with every false positive and false negative documented.

Open project ↗

First-Class Computer Science graduate completing an MSc in Advanced Computer Science at Loughborough University. My interests include prompt injection, agent hijacking, runtime safeguards and adversarial evaluation.

Download CV ↓